Abstract-This work builds on earlier work by Rogaway at Asiacrypt 2004 on tweakable block cipher (TBC) and modes of operations. Our first contribution is to generalize Rogaway's TBC construction by working over a ring R R R and by the use of a masking sequence of functions. The ring R R R can be instantiated as either GF(2 n ) or as 2 . Further, over GF(2 n ), efficient instantiations of the masking sequence of functions can be done using either a binary linear feedback shift register (LFSR); a powering construction; a cellular automata map; or by using a word-oriented LFSR. Rogaway's TBC construction was built from the powering construction over GF(2 n ). Our second contribution is to use the general TBC construction to instantiate constructions of various modes of operations including authenticated encryption (AE) and message authentication code (MAC). In particular, this gives rise to a family of efficient one-pass AE modes of operation. Out of these, the mode of operation obtained by the use of word-oriented LFSR promises to provide a masking method which is more efficient than the one used in the well known AE protocol called OCB1.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
YMMETRIC ciphers form the backbone of encryption technology since all bulk encryptions are done using symmetric ciphers. A block cipher has to be used in an appropriate mode of operation for performing such encryption. Thus, designing efficient and secure modes of operations is as important as developing a secure block cipher.
Of special practical importance are modes of operations for authenticated encryption (AE). This allows both confidentiality and authentication in transmission of messages over an insecure channel. Conventional approaches to this problem require two block cipher invocations per block of the message. In recent years, there have been several proposals for AE which require one invocation per block of the message. This yields efficiency improvement by a factor of two over conventional approaches. The known one-pass proposals are IACBC, IAPM by Jutla [10] ; Manuscript received July 24, 2007; revised December 13, 2007 . An earlier abridged version of the paper was published in Proc. Inscrypt ( XCBC, XECB by Gligor-Donescu [7] ; and OCB, OCB1 by Rogaway [19] . All the above proposals are patented. This has prevented their adoption in NIST standards. In fact, NIST [1] has standardized a two-pass algorithm for achieving AE. Another undesirable effect of the patent claims is that this has led to some researchers proposing new two-pass AE protocols [3] , [14] .
A. Tweakable Block Ciphers
Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [13] introduced the concept of tweakable block cipher (TBC) which is a block cipher with an additional input called a tweak. The tweak is meant to provide variability and not security. More formally, an -bit TBC is a map , where is the key space and is the tweak space. For every fixed and , denoted by is a permutation of . The key is secret. A TBC encrypts an -bit message under a secret key and a nonsecret tweak to obtain an -bit ciphertext . Decryption is similar. One of the primary motivations in [13] for introducing TBC was to build secure modes of operations starting from a TBC. However, the modes of operations given in [13] were not efficient. The theme of designing a suitable TBC and modes of operations based on it was developed by Rogaway in [19] .
B. Rogaway's Construction of TBC and Modes of Operations
The work [19] makes two contributions. First, an efficient method is given for constructing a TBC from a usual block cipher. Each tweak consists of an -bit string and a tuple of nonnegative integers. Efficiency in this context means the following. If is a tweak which is obtained from by incrementing one of the components, then the cost of computing having already computed is one block cipher call plus a small and constant number of shifts, XOR's and conditional operations. This construction is called the powering construction. More details of the construction are given in the context of our contribution in Section I-C.
The second contribution is to obtain various modes of operations of a block cipher using a TBC with an appropriate tweak space as an intermediate step. For example, an AE protocol is obtained in two steps. In the first step, a secure AE protocol is constructed from a TBC with tweak space ; and in the second step it is shown how to construct such a TBC from a block cipher using the earlier mentioned method.
An important consequence is to obtain efficient constructions of several modes of operations. Use of TBC as an intermediate step makes the constructions cleaner and also the proofs clearer and shorter.
C. Our Contributions
In this paper, we develop the work on construction of efficient TBC and modes of operations based on it. Our work depends heavily on the work of Rogaway [19] . Below we mention our specific contributions and relate to the work of [19] .
Tweakable Block Cipher: We define a sequence , with , of functions with a particular set of properties to be a masking sequence. Given block cipher and a masking sequence, we define a TBC having tweak space by either the XE or the XEX constructions.
In the XE construction:
whereas in the XEX construction:
where is the tweak and . Addition (and subtraction) is over a commutative ring with identity. Typical instantiations of are as GF and . In the case where is GF , we use a primitive polynomial to represent GF and consider to be an -bit vector. The map is defined to be , where is an matrix over GF having as its characteristic polynomial. Efficient realization of can be done by a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), a powering construction used in [19] or as a cellular automata (CA) map.
Another representation of GF is as a tower of fields. Under this representation, one can use a word-oriented LFSR to define the 's. Details are given in Section IV-B.
In the case where is , we define where is the least prime greater than . The XE and the XEX constructions were presented in [19] over GF using the powering construction. The abstraction of the ring , the use of LFSR, CA, word-oriented LFSR over GF ; and the instantiation of as are new in this paper. Authenticated Encryption: As mentioned in Section I-B, Rogaway constructs an AE protocol from a TBC and shows how to instantiate the TBC with a block cipher using the powering up construction. This instantiation requires the computation of a discrete logarithm over GF . We show two methods to instantiate Rogaway's AE construction with our general TBC construction. The first method, which we call linear separation, is based on Rogaway's technique. Thus, as in the case of Rogaway, when we work over GF , the linear separation method requires the computation of a discrete logarithm (as a one-time design stage activity). The second method, which we call interleaved separation, is introduced in this paper. This method does not require the discrete log computation and hence is more generally applicable.
In [19] , Rogaway also presents constructions of pseudorandom function (PRF), message authentication code (MAC), and authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) protocols from TBCs with appropriate tweak spaces and shows how to instantiate these with his TBC construction. We show how to instantiate the PRF, MAC, and AEAD protocols of Rogaway with the general TBC construction using the techniques of linear and interleaved separation.
In summary, our generalization of Rogaway's work comes in two parts. 1) Rogaway describes the XE and the XEX constructions over GF using the powering construction. We generalize this by working over a ring which can be instantiated as either GF or as . Over GF , we show that there are other efficient alternatives to the powering construction. Use of LFSR or CA provides similar efficiency as the powering construction, while the use of word-oriented LFSR promises to be faster. 2) Rogaway presents constructions of several modes of operations from TBCs with appropriate tweak spaces and shows how to instantiate these with his TBC constructions. We generalize his method of instantiation and also present a new way of instantiation of the different modes of constructions with the generalized TBC constructions. A net effect of our generalization is to uncover a family of efficient, previously unknown protocols for AE, PRF, MAC, and AEAD. Rogaway's construction is a special case of this family.
D. Practical Significance of our Work
Rogaway's work [19] on AE, MAC, and AEAD provides very efficient constructions with tight security bounds. For example, the AE construction is fully parallelizable; makes block cipher calls for an -block message; and uses an efficient method to generate the masks required. The security bound is already tight and it is quite unlikely that the efficiency can be significantly improved. So, what can one hope to achieve in the context of such excellent prior work?
The starting point of our work is that Rogaway presents a single example of each mode of operation. A natural question that we ask is whether there are other constructions with comparable security and efficiency. Our results show that there are indeed such constructions. We uncover a whole family of constructions which provides a developer with a wide variety of choices. This, by itself, may be considered to be of some practical importance.
In both Rogaway's work and our generalization of the AE protocol, the number of block cipher calls for an block message is . Also, the time for executing the block cipher calls dominates the total time for encryption. However, it is possible to improve upon the efficiency of the mask generation procedure used in Rogaway's algorithm.
As mentioned earlier, one of the methods to implement the masking sequence is to use a word-oriented LFSR. Experience from the stream cipher design community suggests that for software implementation, a word-oriented LFSR is faster than a usual binary LFSR and the powering method. As a result, the AE mode of operation obtained from linear separation and masking using word-oriented LFSRs promises to be faster than the AE protocol (called OCB1) given in [19] , which is based on the powering method.
Further, while the security and efficiency of [19] cannot be significantly improved (because they are already quite tight), one of our constructions offers a flexibility of usage which is not available in Rogaway's work [19] . This has to do with the design stage discrete log computation required in [19] . The discrete log computation is required for different block sizes. More importantly, even for a fixed block size, the discrete log computation is required if the field representing polynomial is changed.
Easily Reconfigurable Family of Modes of Operations: Let us consider the AE protocol, though the discussion below applies equally well to the other protocols. As mentioned earlier, the ring that we work over can be instantiated as GF . The idea is to view the AE mode of operation over GF as being parameterized by the primitive polynomial which represents the field. As a result, for every choice of one obtains a specific mode of operation. Security is not affected-the security bound does not depend on and remains the same for every choice of . There are situations where such a parameterized family of AE modes of operations may be useful. We outline one such possibility.
Consider the following scenario: A crypto company which develops AE modes of operations has many customers. All customers want a provably secure single-pass AE solution. However, they also require that the specific design that they will be using should be kept secret. In the paranoid world of crypto customers, especially from different national defence establishments, this can be a practical requirement.
Is it possible to satisfy such a customer requirement? The answer is yes, at least to a certain extent. The customer can randomly choose the primitive polynomial and keep it a secret. By doing this, the customer does not loose either provable security or efficiency. Basically, in this context, provable security tells him that even if is known, the protocol is as secure as the underlying block cipher. Now, by keeping unknown, he gains an extra level of confidence, since knowledge of is required to attack the system. The only condition on is that it should be primitive. Since the number of primitive polynomials of degree is quite large (for , there are around primitive polynomials), the customer can be assured that an adversary has a rather high uncertainty (about 119 bits) about the specific polynomial he is using.
First, suppose our crypto company wants to use Rogaway's construction to satisfy the needs of the customers. In Rogaway's construction, for each change of , a discrete log computation needs to be performed. The purpose of this computation is to ensure that the discrete log of modulo should be "large," since, otherwise, the proof of security breaks down. This requirement of a discrete log computation per change of polynomial makes Rogaway's construction unsuitable for the above application. Now consider the technique of interleaved separation (introduced in this paper) to construct an AE mode of operation with instantiated as GF . Unlike Rogaway's AE mode of operation, this mode of operation does not require any discrete log computation in the design phase. It is due to this difference, that one can obtain a greater flexibility of usage. Our crypto company creates a single product with as a parameter. In software, this can be provided as an -bit string, while in hardware, this is kept in a register of length . This single product is given to a customer. The customer "customizes" this product by choosing a random primitive polynomial of degree and plugging it into the design. No discrete log computation is required at any stage. Further, in a manner somewhat like a regular key change, the polynomial can also be changed by the customer at regular intervals. This idea can satisfy the customer's apparently conflicting requirements of provable security and obscurity.
We feel that the above practical issue will be attractive to crypto companies who actually develop crypto protocols. They gain a lot of flexibility at no extra cost and at no loss in security. On the other hand, theoreticians might not appreciate this advantage (and may consider the above application as artificial). For them, the abstraction of the masking sequence and the generalized versions of the XE and the XEX constructions will be of more interest.
E. Other Previous and Related Works
The formal model of security for AE was independently proposed by [11] and [2] . Jutla [10] proposed constructions for single-pass AE protocol, including one fully parallelizable protocol. Independent work due to Gligor and Donescu [7] also proposed single-pass AE protocols. A refinement and extension of Jutla's parallelizable protocol was done by Rogaway [20] and was called the OCB. (The masking strategy for the AE protocol OCB1 given in [19] is faster than that of OCB.)
Construction of MAC and AEAD protocols are also of equal importance. There has been a lot of research on the security model and design of these protocols [4] , [9] , [18] . A separate line of research has consisted of developing two-pass AE protocols (some examples are [15] , [3] , [14] ). The work [14] presents an AE protocol which is somewhere between one and two pass protocols.
In a recent work, Minematsu [16] revisits the work on TBC appearing in [13] and [19] . The work [16] provides some improvements to the construction given in [13] . The XEX construction in [19] is presented in a more general form than what has been mentioned earlier in this paper. However, in its application to the construction of modes of operations, this generality is not required and a much more simpler form is used. In this paper, we have generalized this simpler form. In contrast, Minematsu [16] presents a new analysis of the XEX description as given in [19] . We would like to emphasize that none of the techniques for XEX construction introduced in this paper is present in [16] Also, none of the techniques for constructing modes of operations is present in [16] . Thus, this work and that of [16] though on the similar topics, are really of independent interest.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Our notation and definitions closely follow [19] . A block cipher is a map , where is a finite nonempty set called the key space and for all , is a permutation of . A TBC is a map , where is a finite nonempty set called the tweak space and is a permutation of . The inverse of a block cipher is a map such that . Similarly, the inverse of a TBC satisfies . denotes the set of all permutations of and denotes the set of all mappings from to . Similarly, denotes the set of all bit to bit functions and denotes the set of all mappings from to . The notation denotes the choice of a random permutation on bits while denotes the choice of a random permutation for each element . An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm with possible access to encryption and/or decryption oracles. The notation denotes the event that an adversary outputs after interacting with the oracles and . We will assume that an adversary does not ask a query for which it can easily obtain an answer. Thus, it never repeats a query; does not ask for the decryption of a ciphertext which it has previously received as an output of an encryption query; and neither does it ask for the encryption of a plaintext which it has previously received as output of a decryption query. The notation denotes the advantage of an adversary . The definitions of various advantages are as follows.
Definition 1: Let and be a block cipher and a TBC, respectively, and let be an adversary. We define the following advantages.
Here and denote the inverses of and , respectively.
The extension of these advantages to resource bounded advantages are done in the usual manner: over all adversaries that use resources at most . The resources of interest are the number of queries made by the adversary, the total number of -bit blocks provided by the adversary in all its queries and the running time .
III. CONSTRUCTION OF TWEAKABLE BLOCK CIPHERS
Let be a commutative ring with identity. We define a sequence of functions.
Definition 2 (Masking Sequence):
Let be a sequence of functions where each . We say that the sequence is an masking sequence if the following properties hold for a fixed element of .
(1) , for . (2) , for . (3) , for , and . (4) , for , .
Here the operation " " is over . The probabilities are taken over independent and random choices of and from .
In our constructions of 's we will have to be either equal to or slightly less than . There is an efficiency consideration while defining the 's. Given the value of , it should be "easy" to compute . Property (3) of a masking sequence is reminiscent of the definition of almost universal hash functions. This is a keyed family of hash functions, such that for a randomly chosen key from the key space, the probability that two distinct messages collide for the corresponding hash function is low. If Property (3) is viewed in this way, will correspond to the key of the hash function family, whereas and will be the distinct messages. Thus, the correspondence is not very natural and hence we do not explore it any further.
The construction of a TBC that we present below is a natural generalization of the construction given in [19] . We construct a TBC The tweak space . We write to denote .
XE Construction:
In this construction, is defined as follows: (1) where and . XEX Construction: In this construction, is defined as follows: (2) where and .
The operations " " and " " in the XE and the XEX constructions are over the ring . Further, the function is from an masking sequence. The 's act as masks. In the XE construction, the message block is masked, while in the XEX construction both the message block and the output of the encryption are masked. The XE and the XEX constructions were introduced by Rogaway [19] . We generalize by working over and the use of the masking sequence of functions. Later we show that there are several different ways of efficiently instantiating and the masking sequence.
We next prove the security of the XE and the XEX constructions. The proof of the XE construction is very similar to that given in [19] . The proof of the XEX construction was not given in [19] and it was remarked that the proof is similar to that of the XE construction. However, the proof of the XEX construction requires an additional consideration of the range set of a random function and collisions in the range set. Avoiding such collisions requires a little more subtlety than the proof of the XE construction given in [19] . The following result generalizes the XE and the XEX construction of Rogaway by the use of the masking sequence of functions.
Theorem 1 (Security of XE and XEX Constructions):
Security of XE:
Security of XEX:
In both the above inequalities, for constants , . Proof: The proofs of the two constructions are presented separately.
Proof of the XE Construction: As in [19] , a hybrid argument is required. The following five hybrids were identified in [19] .
.
We have to bound . The bounds on , , and obtained in [19] also hold in our case. These bounds are as follows.
1) . 2) . 3)
The main part of the proof is to bound . We consider two games and . Game : Each adversarial query is a triple , where is the tweak and is the message block. At the outset, a flag bad is set to false and the function is declared to be undefined everywhere. As the adversary's queries are answered, the function begins to get defined at certain points of the domain. Let denote the set of points at which has currently been defined. Thus, initially is empty. The adversary then starts its queries. The th query is denoted by and is answered as follows. 
Return
The above is similar to the algorithm given in of [19, Fig. 1 ] with one exception. In Step 6, we use the function and the addition is over the ring .
Game : This game is the same as except that the statement in
Step 3 and the statement in Step 7 are dropped.
Game
is an accurate simulation of the game defining the experiment associated with while does this for . The games and are identical until the flag is set to true. Thus, we have sets to true in . We now have to upper-bound this probability.
The values are returned to the adversary. These are random quantities and the adversary could as well have generated these by itself. Thus, these provide the adversary with no information and we may assume that the adversary is nonadaptive. It asks a fixed sequence of queries hoping that some and will collide, or some and will collide. We now bound the probability of such collisions. In each of the above cases, we have the probability of a collision to be upper-bounded by . The domain contains at most elements and hence the probability of a collision among the domain elements (whence is set to true) is at most . This completes the proof of the XE construction. Proof of the XEX Construction: The proof of the XEX construction is more complicated, since the adversary is allowed to make decryption queries. The idea of the proof, however, is the same. On both encryption and decryption queries, the simulator returns random strings to the adversary and then adjusts the internal variables in a consistent manner. For the XE construction, the probability the adversary's advantage is bounded above by the probability of a collision in the . For the XEX construction, the simulator needs to maintain both and and the adversary's advantage is bounded above by the probability of a collision in either or . The collision analysis for is a little different from that of as we point out later in the proof.
We assume that the adversary does not make any; pointless queries. In other words, the adversary does not query the decryption oracle with , if it had earlier obtained as the output of an encryption query with . The converse is also assumed to hold, i.e., it does not query the encryption oracle with , if it had earlier obtained as the output of a decryption query . Further, it does not repeat a query to either the encryption or the decryption oracles.
The hybrids in the case of the XEX construction are the following.
As before, we have to bound . The bounds on and are the same as in the case of the XE construction while the bound on is slightly different to take care of the fact that decryption queries are allowed.
1) . 2) . 3)
Again, the main part of the proof is to bound . Let us call the experiment associated with to be Game . In moving from Game 2 to Game 3, we are replacing the permutation by the random function and the permutation by the random function . In Game 3, the random functions and are used as in the XEX construction. In particular, is used whenever an encryption query is made and is used whenever a decryption query is made.
In Game 4, and are from the set . In other words, (also ) is a collection of random functions, one for each tweak in . Thus, for each (tweak, message) pair , the adversary expects to obtain a random bit string. We now present a unified description of Games 3 and 4. The th query is either of the form or depending on whether the query is an encryption or a decryption query. The set Domain is the domain of and the range of , while the set Range is the range of and the domain of . Game 3 is the entire game, while Game 4 is obtained by removing the boxed entries. Both the games are the same unless is set. Hence, is bounded above by the probability that is set. Our next task is to analyze this probability. In Game 4, the adversary obtains random strings on any input which it can generate by itself. Hence, we may assume the adversary to be nonadaptive. It submits a sequence of encryption and decryption queries and tries to set to be true. In fact, we will do more; we will allow the adversary to specify both the message and the ciphertext in all its queries and show that the probability of being true is still small. Thus, the adversaries queries are now of the form for . The elements of the set Domain are of the form whereas the elements of the set Range are of the form . Note that the values are never repeated in the domain. Further, now we have each and to be adversarily chosen and hence cannot assume any probability distribution on these quantities.
The domain set is similar to the case of the XE construction. Hence, the collision analysis of domain is similar to that of the XE construction and we obtain that the probability of being set due to collision in domain is at most . We now consider collisions in Range. There are three pairs of variables to consider giving rise to three cases below. , then we have to consider , which by Property 2 of the masking sequence is bounded above by . Thus, in all cases, we have shown that the probability of a collision in between two range elements is bounded above by . The range set has at most elements and hence the probability of a range collision is at most .
Note:
In the above proof, we have used Property 2 of Definition 2, namely, , for any fixed string and any randomly chosen string . If for any , we have , then clearly the above condition cannot hold. Thus, in our instantiations of the masking functions, we have been careful to avoid for any . A similar condition is also highlighted in [16] .
IV. INSTANTIATING
The XE and the XEX constructions and the security proofs are obtained in the abstract setting of the ring using a masking sequence. For efficient implementation, we have to specify and also define appropriate masking sequences . The ring can be endowed with two natural structures: The finite field GF and the ring . Note that once and the are specified, both the XE and the XEX constructions become concrete.
A. as GF
The set can be considered to be the set of all binary polynomials of degree less than and made into the field GF under multiplication modulo a fixed irreducible polynomial of degree . For our purpose, we will choose to be a primitive polynomial. Let be an matrix over GF having as its characteristic polynomial. We consider to be an -bit row vector. For , define
Proposition 1: The sequence defined by (5) is an masking sequence (see Definition 2). Proof:
(1) Note that . Since is invertible, the matrix is also invertible. If is uniformly distributed, the random variable is also uniformly distributed over and hence we have the desired result.
It is sufficient to show that the map is a bijection for any . In (3) below, we prove a more general result from which this follows.
(3) For , define . We have to show that if is uniformly distributed over , then so is . This is achieved by showing that is a bijection. To prove Property 3 of Definition 2, we may assume . However, the bijective property holds even if one of or is (but not both). So we will assume this in the argument below, which will also provide a proof of (2) [12] ). Since , the fact that contradicts the above property of . Hence, we must have and . This shows that is an injection. Since it is a map from a finite set to itself, this implies that it is also a bijection. This completes the proof of (2).
(4) Since and are independent random quantities and the maps and are bijective maps, it follows that and are also independent and uniformly distributed random quantities and hence their difference is uniformly distributed over .
To specify the function , it is sufficient to specify the matrix in (5) . For the proof of Proposition 1, we only need to be a primitive polynomial. However, a multiplication by a general can be costly compared to one block cipher invocation.
On the other hand, if has a simple form then it can be very fast to implement. We point out three efficient choices of . Let
Note that since is primitive (and hence irreducible), the constant term must be . Define the matrix (having characteristic polynomial ) as follows:
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR):
We set . The matrix (and hence ) can be implemented using a binary LFSR (see [12] ).
Powering Construction: Let be a polynomial of degree less than . The map used in [19] is . Let
. If the coefficients of (resp., ) are given by a vector (resp., ), then , where is the transpose of . Thus, in this case . Cellular Automata (CA): Another (perhaps less well known) linear map is a CA map. In this map, the matrix is a tridiagonal matrix of the following form:
, if ; or , if ; and otherwise. The diagonal entries of can be obtained from the polynomial using a tridiagonalization procedure due to Tezuka and Fushimi [21] .
Efficiency: All the above three methods are equally efficient to implement in both hardware and software. Thus, the LFSRand the CA-based methods should be seen as comparable rather than better alternatives.
B. Word-Oriented LFSR
Suppose
and consider GF to be GF , i.e., as an extension field of degree over GF . Let be an irreducible polynomial over GF of degree and let GF be represented using . Let be a primitive polynomial over GF (as represented by ) of degree . Then, it is well known that does not divide for [12] . The field GF is represented using and . As is standard, when working modulo , we will identify polynomials over GF of degree at most with vectors over GF of dimension . Let be an matrix with entries from GF . For GF define (6) It is possible to show in a manner similar to that of Proposition 1, that the 's defined in (6) also form a masking sequence of functions.
The idea of using a tower of fields is not new. This idea is well known to the stream cipher community. Many stream ciphers have been proposed which use word-oriented LFSRs. For example, SNOW 1.0 uses the following parameters (see [6] ):
, and , , and , where . The polynomial is irreducible over GF and is primitive over GF . These two polynomials define an LFSR of length over GF . In software, the time for obtaining the next state of this LFSR is significantly faster than obtaining the next state of an LFSR of length over GF . This advantage in speed can also be utilized in the current context. We choose to be a matrix which corresponds to one-step evolution of an LFSR whose connection polynomial is . Then the value of can be obtained from by evolving an LFSR over GF once. To ensure that this is fast, we need to carefully choose the pair of polynomials and in a manner similar to that of SNOW 1.0 described above. The advantage is that, for software implementation, the corresponding word-oriented LFSR will be faster than any of the methods (powering, binary LFSR or CA) which work directly over GF .
It is also possible to realize GF as a three-part extension. For example, GF can be realized as a degree-four extension over GF
. Such an idea has been used in SNOW 2.0 [6] . Again, for software implementation, such a word-oriented LFSR is faster than the powering method or binary LFSR. This shows that there are several possible ways of designing masking methods which are faster than the powering method used by Rogaway [19] .
C. as
The set can be considered to be the set of all nonnegative integers less than and made into the ring by performing addition and multiplication modulo . Defining the masking sequence over is a bit tricky. This is because does not form a field. We first expand into a field. Let be a prime. Typically, we will choose the first such prime. We write . Then is an -bit integer and is usually very small compared to . Such primes are easy to find using standard mathematical software packages. For example, using PARI, we obtain the table of primes shown in Table I . These cover the most typical values of used in practical applications. The set is a field under addition and multiplication modulo and this field contains the integers . For , we define
This idea of embedding the ring into a field has been earlier used in the literature [8] , [22] . However, it has not been used in the context that we have used and to the best of our knowledge, the following result has not appeared earlier.
Proposition 2:
The sequence defined by (7) is an masking sequence (see Definition 2).
Proof: (1) First note that the map is an injection from to . We can divide the image set of this map into two sets and , where and . Now, when we perform the modulo operation, two elements of cannot collide and . Thus, This shows that the number of pre-images of any element in under is at most . Since the input of is chosen uniformly at random from , the probability of occurrence of any element in the range of is at most . This completes the proof of (2) . (4) Let and be the dependent random variables defined from and , respectively. Then and are independent random variables having identical distribution. From the proof of (1) they take values from the set with probabilities , , and . The event can be decomposed into the disjoint events ( and ) for all . Using the independence of and , we have This completes the proof of (3).
The security bound (obtained from the value of ) of Proposition 2 is a little weaker than that of Proposition 1
. This results from the fact that we have to enlarge the ring into the field . On the other hand, the slight decrease in the security bound is immaterial from a practical point of view.
Efficiency: We will be computing the 's one after the other. Note that both and are in . We first initialize a variable to . The value of will be evaluated modulo , i.e., can take any value between and . If we denote the th value of by , then . To compute , we add and modulo and take the last bits of the result to be the value of . This requires only one multiprecision integer addition and at most one subtraction. Thus, software implementation of will be efficient. The exact comparative efficiency between the GF -based method and the -based method will, to some extent, depend on the implementation details. We note though, that both the methods will be quite efficient and the difference in speed may not be significant, especially in comparison to one block cipher invocation. Again, we do not claim to provide a more efficient alternative to the powering method of Rogaway; our claim is to provide another similarly efficient alternative to the powering method.
V. AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION
An authenticated encryption protocol consists of an encryption and a decryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm takes as input (the key and) a nonce and message and produces as output a ciphertext which consists of an encryption of the message and a tag. The decryption algorithm takes as input (the key and) a nonce and a ciphertext and produces either the corresponding message or returns invalid. Rogaway [19] obtains an AE protocol in two steps.
1) Given a TBC where and an integer , Rogaway provides a construction of an AE protocol.
2) The TBC is instantiated in [19] using a TBC obtained by the powering construction over GF from XEX. Rogaway's AE construction from the TBC also holds in the more general setting of . Our contribution is essentially to the second step above. Recall that we have provided the construction of a TBC Using this, we have to instantiate the . This means that we have to map the set to the set . Let be this map. The requirement on is that it should be an injective map. (In [19] , this requirement is called unique representability in the context of the powering construction over GF .) Our contribution to the AE protocol of Rogaway [19] is in the different definitions of . We show two ways of defining . The first method, which we call linear separation, is based on Rogaway's method. The second method, which we call interleaved separation, is new to this work.
Let . Fig. 1 shows the AE protocol of [19] written using the 's. The statement on the security of the protocol is given in Section V-D.
In Fig. 1 , the tweaks are used to encrypt the message blocks and the tweak is used to encrypt the tag. Thus, for the purpose of efficiency, the following two tasks must be efficient. We next show two different methods for defining and efficiency of the two tasks in both the methods.
A. Linear Separation
Let be an integer such that . Define (8) The injectivity of is easily verified. In Fig. 1 , the use of (8) implies the following.
• For the message blocks we use masks .
• For the tag we use the mask . We now consider the two tasks. 1) Task 1.: Recall that earlier it has been shown that it is easy to obtain from for both the cases when is realized as GF or as . 2) Task 2.: We show the efficiency of this task separately for the realization of as GF and .
as GF : In this case, the technique of [19] is applicable. Let be the discrete log of in GF realized using the primitive polynomial . (For , the corresponding values of are computed in [19] and satisfy the condition on .) Thus, and so for some polynomial . Recall that the matrix used to define the masking sequence of functions has as its characteristic polynomial. Using the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, it follows that and hence Fig. 1 . Encryption and decryption algorithms of an AE protocol over R R R. The encryption algorithm takes as input (K; N; M) where K is the key, N is the nonce, and M is the message. It produces as output a pair (C; ). The decryption algorithm takes as input (K; N; (C; )), where K and N are key and nonce, respectively, and (C; ) is the ciphertext and tag pair. It produces as output either the message M or says that the pair (C; ) is invalid. Here 1 (N ) = f(N).
. Thus, for any , we have . Hence, we have
In other words, given we compute in the following manner: Compute and set . Computation of requires one application of , which is efficient in all the three cases-LFSR, powering, and CA.
Word-Oriented LFSR: As discussed earlier, such LFSRs are very efficient to implement. In particular, they are faster than the powering method of Rogaway [19] . To use word-oriented LFSRs with the technique of linear separation, we need to obtain and (see Section IV-B) such that the discrete log of modulo is "large." We can then choose to be equal to this discrete log and the discussion given above will hold. We have not tried to obtain a "suitable" pair but we expect that there are many such pairs for and . For any such pair, the masking part of the resulting AE mode of operation will be significantly faster than the algorithm OCB given by Rogaway [19] . as : We choose . Recall that in this case and . Then and can be computed from using one modulo multiplication.
B. Interleaved Separation
In this case, we define in the following manner:
The injectivity of is easily verified. In Fig. 1 , the use of this map implies the following.
• For the tag we use the mask . The advantage of this method over the linear separation technique is that it does not require the computation of a discrete log during the design stage when is instantiated as GF . The computation of Tasks 1 and 2 are quite efficient though it is a little slower than the linear separation method. Simple implementation tricks can speed up the mask computation.
C. Comparison of the AE Protocols
At a top level, we have four single-pass AE protocols. There are two options for instantiating the ring (either as GF or as ) and two options for constructing the protocol (either using linear or interleaved separation). This gives rise to a total of four different possibilities. Further, when we realize as GF there are different possibilities for implementing . We have indicated four-as an LFSR; using the powering construction; as a CA; or using a word-oriented LFSR. Out of all these AE protocols, the masking method using word-oriented LFSR and linear separation will be the fastest. We mention that we have not implemented any of the AE protocols mentioned in this paper. Such work, we believe, is outside the scope of the current paper. A careful implementation of the different candidate algorithms and fine tuning the parameters is a possible future work.
The AE protocol in [19] corresponds to the instantiation of as GF ; as the powering construction and using the technique of linear separation. Clearly, this is a special case of the suite of AE protocols that we have developed. There are other single-pass protocols which do not fall within the general description that we have developed. In particular, the protocols of Gligor and Donescu [7] , Jutla [10] , and the earlier protocol of Rogaway [20] are not covered by our general description.
Efficiency of Linear Versus Interleaved Separation:
In the linear separation technique, the masks are used for the message blocks, where as in the interleaved separation technique, the masks are used for the message blocks. Thus, it may seem that the interleaved separation technique results in a much slower AE protocol compared to the linear separation technique. We argue that this is not the case. In particular, when is realized as , both methods have same efficiency. When is realized as GF , the interleaved method can be slightly slower but not significantly so, since the difference in the time for generating the masks is negligible in comparison to the time required for the block cipher invocations.
Suppose is realized as . Then . As mentioned earlier, we will be using a variable whose th value is . Then and . So, if we compute once at the beginning, then computing from is as efficient as computing from . This shows that for as , both linear and interleaved separation techniques have similar efficiency. Now consider the case when is realized as GF . There are four possibilities-binary LFSR; powering; CA; and word-oriented LFSR. For concreteness, let us consider the powering method. We have to compare the time for computing (in the interleaved separation method) with that of computing (in the linear separation method). The first operation takes more time than the second operation, though not necessarily twice as much time.
More importantly, however, both these operations should be seen in the context of an AE mode of operation. Let and , respectively, be the times for these two operations and let be the time for one block cipher call. Then, the interleaved separation technique requires time per block, where as the linear separation technique requires time per block. We argue that the difference is negligible with respect to . Our rationale is that a block cipher performs much more operations than a few shifts and XOR's needed to implement a modulo multiplication by . For example, AES-128 performs 160 table lookups in addition to other operations. A careful implementation (which we have not done) of the two methods can settle this point.
There is another aspect that we would like to point out. The previous construction of Rogaway [19] works directly over GF and uses the technique of linear separation. To this we would like to compare the use of word-oriented LFSR using the interleaved method. Let be the time to generate the next mask in the first method (i.e., the time to compute one multiplication by ) and be the time to compute the next mask in the second method (i.e., the time to compute two evolutions of a word-oriented LFSR). The experience from design of stream ciphers suggests that for software implementation, is less than . In other words, the interleaved technique with word-oriented LFSR will be faster than the linear separation technique with the powering method (as used by Rogaway). Again, a careful implementation, which we have not done, will settle this point.
An Easily Reconfigurable Family: Consider the situation when is implemented as GF . In this case, the field representing polynomial can be viewed as parameterizing the mode of operation. In other words, the construction can be viewed as a family of modes of operations, indexed by the set of primitive polynomials over GF . All constructions in the family have the same efficiency and the same security guarantee. Choosing selects a particular member from the family.
The number of primitive polynomials over GF of degree is equal to , where is the Euler totient which is the number of positive integers less than and coprime to . The quantity is fairly large (for , this value is around ) and so we have a rather large family of modes of operations. Now, suppose we use Rogaway's construction, i.e., the powering method with linear separation. In this case, whenever is changed, we need to verify that the discrete log of with respect to the new is "large" as otherwise the security proof might not hold. Thus, each change of requires a discrete log computation.
In contrast, consider the interleaved separation technique. This does not require any discrete log computation. Hence, we can choose any primitive polynomial and immediately obtain a construction. In both software and hardware implementations, the primitive polynomial can be provided as a parameter-in software as part of a header file and in hardware as a register. Choosing a new primitive polynomial and changing this parameter is quite simple. This provides an easily reconfigurable design. As discussed in Section I-D, this feature may have a practical appeal to developers of cryptographic products.
D. Security of AE Protocols
The security of an authenticated encryption protocol consists of two parts-privacy and authenticity. The adversary is given access to the encryption oracle and is assumed to be nonce respecting, i.e., it does not repeat a nonce in its queries to the oracle. Following Rogaway [19] , the privacy of a encryption scheme against a nonce respecting adversary is defined in the sense of "indistinguishability from random strings" in the following manner:
where is an oracle that takes as input and returns many random bits as output. For defining authenticity, the adversary is said to successfully forge if it outputs a pair which is valid and was not the result of any prior query. Formally forges
The result on the security of the AE protocol of Fig. 1 is stated below and is a minor modification of [17, Corollary 14] .
Theorem 2: Let be constructed as in Fig. 1 . Let be instantiated by a block cipher .
2) where for some absolute constant ; if is realized as GF , and with if is realized as .
VI. MAC CONSTRUCTION
A MAC protocol consists of two algorithms. The tag-generation algorithm takes as input (a key and) a message and produces as output a tag. The verification algorithm takes as input (a key and) a message-tag pair and returns either true (if the pair is valid) or false (if it is invalid).
In [19] , the TBC obtained from the XE construction is used to construct a MAC protocol. In fact, a more general construction of a tweakable PRF is presented in [19] . A tweakable PRF is a map where is the key space, is the tweak space, is the message space and . Under the assumption (implicit in [19] ) that at most blocks are permissible in a single message, the general construction is described using a TBC The set , where is a small positive integer , is considered to be a tweak to the PRF (and hence MAC) algorithm itself.
For each tweak , the MAC algorithm associates a mask . The algorithm of [19] written in terms of the 's is shown in Fig. 2 . The security statement is given in Section VI-C. The first message blocks are masked using and the last encryption is masked using or according as whether the last block is full or partial.
The TBC is instantiated by the TBC which, in turn, is instantiated by the block cipher . This chain of instantiations can be written as follows:
where and is an injective map. As in the case of AE, we identify two techniques for defining the map .
A. Linear Separation
Let and be two positive integers satisfying the following two conditions.
• .
• for and . Define (10) Lemma 1: The map defined in (10) We now consider the two possibilities for . 1) as GF : The values of and are, respectively, the discrete logs of and with respect to the lexicographically first primitive polynomial of degree over GF . These values have been computed in [19] for and and satisfy the required condition for .
where . Note that is a tweak to the MAC algorithm itself and is independent of the actual message to be authenticated. At the start, we compute . The value is computed and then the map is applied times to it. This can be done by the following algorithm. 2. for to do 3. ; ; ;
end do;
Executing the above algorithm requires a total of applications of . Recall that each application of is very cheap when is realized using either an LFSR, or a powering construction, or as a CA map.
Once is computed, we can iteratively compute by applying to the previously generated value. Suppose the last value that is obtained is . To we apply . 
B. Interleaved Separation
In this case, we define (11) The injectivity of is readily verified. Starting from it is easy to compute iteratively for both the cases when is GF or . Finally, it is also easy to compute the value of from in both cases. This technique does not require the integers and and hence in the case of being realized as GF there is no need for any discrete log computation. The disadvantage is that compared to the technique of linear separation, this technique is costlier. Computing the masks is about times costlier. In the case, where , as in the application to the construction of AEAD, this cost is within tolerable limits.
C. Security
As in [19] , the MAC construction is secure as a tweakable PRF. The advantage of an adversary with respect to a tweakable PRF is defined in the following manner: (12) The security result of the MAC construction is similar to that of [17, Corollary 17] . We state the corresponding result. 
VII. AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION WITH ASSOCIATED DATA
An AEAD is a protocol which allows the authentication of a header (also called associated data) without encrypting it. The encryption algorithm for an AEAD protocol takes as input (the key and) a header, a nonce, and a message. It produces as output a ciphertext which consists of the encryption of the message and a tag which authenticates both the message and the header. The decryption algorithm takes as input (the key and) a header, a nonce and a ciphertext. It produces as output either the corresponding message or returns invalid. Authenticating the header without encrypting it is of use in some practical situations. One example is Internet packets which consist of a header and a message. Both of these must be authenticated. However, if the header is encrypted, then it will be difficult for Internet routers to forward the packets. An AEAD protocol exactly fits this application. See [18] for more details on applications of AEAD.
It has been shown in [19] that the tweakable MAC can be combined with the AE construction to obtain an AEAD construction. The basic idea is to use the technique of ciphertext translation from [18] and tweak the MAC construction using . The header is authenticated by the MAC algorithm and the message is encrypted using the AE algorithm. Finally, the tag for the header is XORed into the required number of last bits of the output of the AE algorithm (which is the ciphertext and the tag for the message). We discuss how this can be done in our setting.
The input to the AEAD algorithm is a triple , where is an -bit nonce, is the header, and is the message. Let be an injective map (obtained by either the linear or the interleaved separation) from to . For and , we define a set of masks . The MAC construction requires a TBC obtained by the XE construction, while the AE construction requires a TBC obtained by the XEX construction. Both these constructions require masks of the type . Defining these masks will make the algorithm precise.
The masks for the first header blocks in the MAC algorithm are where . The mask for the last header block is or according as whether is full or partial.
In the AE algorithm, the masks are used as follows. The masks for the message blocks are where . The mask for encrypting the checksum in the AE algorithm is . With the above mask definitions and the protocols in Figs. 1 and 2 , it is easy to fill out the details of the AEAD protocol.
VIII. DIFFERENT MAC AND AEAD CONSTRUCTIONS
The MAC construction described in Section VI is essentially the construction in [19] instantiated by the more general tweakable block cipher construction with the option of applying either the linear or the interleaved separation techniques. In this section, we describe a MAC construction which is different from that in [19] and an AEAD protocol based on it. The MAC construction that we describe is closer to the construction in [4] . The algorithm is described in Fig. 2 . It requires the masks and either or . Defining these masks from the -functions is easy. For , define where Thus, starting from , we compute the masks in an iterative manner. The (minor) disadvantage is that we have to carry forward the values of both and . This is because it is only at the end of the message we get to know which one will be required.
AEAD Protocol: Based on this MAC protocol, we can define an AEAD protocol in the following manner. Actually, we slightly modify the MAC protocol by defining and for (13) The outline of the AEAD algorithm is as follows. Let there be header blocks and message blocks . The last header block can be partial and the last message block can be partial. 1) Generate a MAC for the header using Fig. 3 but using the definition of given by (13) and with . Let be the produced tag. If the header is empty, set to be the empty string. 2) Encrypt the message blocks using the AE algorithm of Fig. 1 but using the mask (with , where is the nonce) for the th message block and the mask for the checksum .
This gives us the pair , where is the ciphertext and is the tag. 3) XOR into the last bits of and return the result.
IX. CONCLUSION
The concept of TBCs and the theme of designing modes of operations based upon TBCs was introduced in [13] . The first efficient construction of TBCs was presented in [19] and the same paper presented AE, MAC, and AEAD protocols. We build on the work in [19] . Our first contribution is to present a general construction of an efficient TBC. We work over a ring which can be instantiated as either GF or as . The construction of TBC in [19] can be seen as a special case (instantiating as GF and using the powering construction) of our construction. The general TBC construction is used to instantiate general constructions of AE, MAC, and AEAD protocols from [19] in several ways. This leads to a suite of efficient protocols for these applications out of which only one of each kind has been described earlier in [19] .
